WW II: One Soldier’s Story – Chapter 7 – Armored Division Tactics after Breakthrough

There are not many who were part of the U.S. Army’s Armored Forces during WW II. But, since many served in the U.S. Military in other capacities during the war, it could be of interest to read about the devastatingly successful employment of the tactics developed during 1940 to 1943 by then Major Gen. (Later General) George S. Patton, Jr., and his staff.

As the U.S. Third Army closed on the Rhine River in early 1945, the collapse of the German Army seemed imminent. But, Adolf Hitler was boasting that his armies could never be defeated as he had built a “redoubt” in the Austrian Alps with defenses and supplies sufficient to allow them to fight for “a thousand years” (His words, not ours!). This claim was believed only by Herr Hitler and by the Allied intelligence staffs, not by the GI’s fighting the war. Nevertheless, Headquarters thought it necessary to cut off the retreat of the many German Divisions seen moving toward Austria to deny them access to this “redoubt”. A mission was assigned to the Third Army, then on down to the 11th Armored Division, of which I was a member. Our mission was to cross the Rhine River, advance to the Austrian Alps, cut off the retreating German Divisions, find and destroy the “redoubt” and link up with the Russian forces then fighting their way into and through Austria. Our line of advance was to be from Andernach, on the Rhine River just south of the Remagen Bridge, to Worms. We were then to cross the Rhine at Oppenheim and push north and east, skirting Frankfurt, and force the Fulda Gap. The Fulda Gap had been the preferred way over many centuries for Eastern countries to attack west or for Western countries to attack east. We were then to turn southeast along the line from Coburg to Bayreuth, skirt the border of Czechosolovakia to Regen and continue on to Linz in Austria on the Danube River where we would link up with the White Russian Army expected to arrive there about the same time.

To accomplish this mission, our division was assigned squadrons from the 9th Tactical Air Force, Lt. Gen. “Pete” Quesada commanding, flying mainly P-47 Thunderbolts (hey, our division had its own nickname as “The Thunderbolt”) along with air-ground coordinators to keep these planes off our own people. Additionally, we added diversified combat units and many quartermaster truck companies charged with the mission of keeping us supplied with ammunition, gasoline, food, and other essentials. These were later augmented with flights of C-47 cargo planes landing on German Autobahns next to our moving columns to unload precious freight.

The tactics of an armored division in open country are designed to maximize shock power, particularly when the enemy’s front lines have been penetrated as we did during the Battle of the Bulge, during our reduction of the Siegfried Line, during the crossing of the Schnee Eiffel mountain range and during our march through the Rhineland. By the first of April, we had crossed the Rhine and forced the Fulda Gap. Our tanks and armored infantry were rampaging across the German armies’ lines of communication so rapidly that they did not know we were there until we began shooting at them!

The combat formation of choice by the Division was to attack over parallel road nets, when available, using two Combat Commands up front and the remaining Combat Command in reserve. Each Combat Command, as it was constituted in 1945, had a battalion of tanks, a battalion of armored infantry, a battalion of self-propelled 105 mm howitzers, a company of armored engineers, a company of armored signal troops, a medical company, an MP platoon, the Command HQ, and such other supporting units as the Division Commander might elect to attach. These additional units might include tank destroyers, 155 mm self-propelled howitzers and/or rifles, anti-aircraft defense vehicles, armored cavalry troops, bridging companies, etc. Such a Combat Command is a formidable force! Our division had 3 of them. All of these units were on wheels. Nobody walked! The 3 Combat Commands were identified as CCA, Brigadier General Willard A. Holbrook, Jr. commanding, CCB, and CCR. My 21st Armored Infantry Battalion was usually assigned to CCB, but all the units were equally trained so they could be switched between Combat Commands as the tactical situation demanded with no loss of combat power or efficiency, and with intact command, control and communications. CCA and CCB usually attacked in tandem, with CCR in reserve ready to exploit any advantage gained by a forward unit, or to replace any battalion that needed reinforcing, regrouping, or resupplying. Our one division was a terrifying fighting force and we had 15 more of them in Europe during WW II!

Our tactics on the road, worked out with the air supporting units, were magnificent. When one of the combat commands met with resistance along the road, or on approach to a town that appeared to be defended, it halted just out of range of the defenders’ expected fire capability. The P-47s would buzz the defenders. The artillery would lay down a few rounds on the outskirts of the defended area. The psycho-warfare soldiers with their loudspeakers and German language talkers would announce that if surrender was not offered within 15 minutes, the planes would attack and the artillery would open fire. Then the tanks and infantry riding these tanks would barrel in and any house that did not have a white flag showing would be leveled by tank cannon fire. The phrases “collateral damage” and “winning of hearts and minds” were not included in our division language. These people had declared war on America and we were there to show them the error of their ways! If all buildings showed white flags, they were not molested.

But, German infantry in some towns would retreat to the cellars or attics, allow the armored vehicles to pass and then open up on the supporting units such as the quartermaster 2 ½ ton trucks carrying our vital supplies. That town then died!

Our supporting air power and their air-ground coordination was most effective. Not only was their show of lethal intent so impressive as to avoid unnecessary casualties, they also scouted ahead along our route of advance looking for signs of organized resistance, while at the same time protecting our totally open right flank from possible counter-attack by the by-passed German divisions. The American army had finally learned how to fight as an integrated and combat effective infantry-tank-artillery-air force team! Hey, it works!

Biographical Sketch:
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